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Abstract
The task of managing general game playing in a
multi-agent system is the problem addressed in
this paper. It is considered to be done by an
agent. There are many reasons for constructing
such an agent, called general game management
agent. This agent manages strategic interactions
between other agents - players, natural or also arti-
ficial. The agent records the interaction for further
benchmarking and analysis. He can also be used
for a kind of restricted communications. His be-
havior is defined by a game description written in
a logic-based language. The language, we present
for this application, is more expressive than the lan-
guage GDL, which is already used for such pur-
poses. Our language can represent imperfect in-
formation and time dependent elements of a game.
Time dependent elements like delays and timeouts
are of crucial importance for interactions between
players with bounded processing power like hu-
mans. We provide examples to show the feasibility
of our approach. A way for game theoretical solv-
ing of an interaction description in our language is
considered as future work.
1 Introduction
If rational agents interact, they pursuit their interests. It is not
surprising, because rational agents persuit their interests all
the time. If agents are advanced enough, they know or try to
find out the interests of other agents and that their interests
are also known or tried to be found out and so on. It is called
strategic interaction. The common knowledge of rationality
between the agents is one of the base assumptions needed for
classical game theoretic analysis. In game theory, we have
the notion of equilibrium. An equilibrium is a combination
of behaviors, none of whose owners is interested in deviating
from. If a game (used as synonym to strategic interaction)
has a finite number of participants, their action and states, it
is finite. Infinite games are difficult to model for computation.
This work considers only finite games. A finite game has at
least one (mixed strategies) equilibrium [Nash, 1951]. Find-
ing the equilibria is solving games. But, the calculating of the
exact solution costs time. In most real-life domains, agents
have not enough time or they are not advanced enough to do
it properly. Real agents are supposed to behave suboptimally.
For instance, humans deviate even in very primitive games
like Roshambo significantly from equilibria [Tagiew, 2009].
In Artificial Intelligence, games are interesting from at
least two points of view - mechanism design and agent de-
sign [Russel and Norvig, 2003, p.632]. In mechanism design,
we want to achieve a kind of (cooperative) behavior and need
rules. For agent design, we have rules and try to derive opti-
mal behavior. In most cases, the system represents one spe-
cial game like chess and has to compute the best strategy as
fast as possible. In such cases, the game is represented by a
pile of low level code. In practical view, every agent has to
represent the game and then a component is required which
represents the game for all agents. In global view, this re-
quired component is a (game) server, which implements rules
for interaction. This means, that one has to solve in general
two tasks for game computing - game server and game solver.
Game solver is the part used by agents. There are many tech-
niques for computational solving games - from optimal game
theoretic to suboptimal AI heuristics. If we have a library
with code for chess game server and a library for an agent,
which does his best in playing chess, it does not mean that
we can use this libraries for other games. Additionally, there
is a hard manageable game representing code on both sides.
The low-level code based game server can not send the game
rules to the players, unless he sends his code. The game rules
are typically reflected in a network communication protocol
for the server. Consequently, if an agent does not have a rep-
resentation of the game, he can not participate properly in
it. And we can not describe in a clean way a behavior of an
agent as depending on rules of the game, because these rules
are hard-coded.
In next section we provide basic concepts for this paper.
Then, we present the definition of our strategic interaction
definition language (SIDL1). In section 4, we describe the al-
gorithms around SIDL. Section 5 present some application
examples. After it, we conclude and look forward.
2 Preliminaries
To get rid of the problems described in the previous section,
one has to develop a high level language to define games.
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Summarized, it causes following advantages:
• A clear and convertible representation of a game is
given. Convertible means that it can be easily con-
verted to other representation formats and formalisms.
Such representations can be exchanged between systems
- from a game server to a player e.g..
• The game solver and the game server use the same file.
This reduces redundancy. It also guarantees that both
run on the same game.
• The rules can be edited easier. One can also develop al-
gorithms, which manipulate game representation in any
possible way - ’remove simultaneous turns’ or ’reduce
number of players’ e.g..
• One can develop techniques for defining behaviors of
players on the basis of a game description. Players
which are defined for playing multiple kinds of games
can be constructed and benchmarked.
The only disadvantage can be the computation time. Low
level code solutions for specific games can be done slighter
[Genesereth et al., 2005]. That saves computation time.
The idea of a game description language is already par-
tially considered in GALA-System [Koller and Pfeffer, 1997]
and GGP [Genesereth et al., 2005]. The GALA-System is a
high level language based game solver. Solving of games
in GALA is based on a state-of-art game theoretic software
GAMBIT [Turocy, 2008]. The GALA-Language is a logic
based language, which enables a prolog interperter to gener-
ate huge game trees for GAMBIT. Game trees for GAMBIT
are huge, because they have inter alia repeated states. GGP
is about a high level language based game server using the
logic based language GDL. It is used for AI programming
contests. GALA and GGP are independent. The language
PNSI [Tagiew, 2008a] is able satisfy both tasks - game server
and solver. PNSI is based on Petri Nets. Unfortunately,
Petri Nets based representation is not so slight as a logic
based approach. Using logic, we can define game rules more
generally.
We consider the general game management as a task of
an agent and not as a server. Our definition of the game
management agent2 (GMA) is similar to the definition of
the world and market agents in the computational economics
framework ACE [Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006]. The world
agent manages the state of the environment and the market
agent manages prices. General GMA (GGMA) is a GMA,
which is based on general game description language. The
goal of our GGMA is in general ’producing’ agents’s strate-
gic interaction. To ’produce’ means here to let it happen. For
other agents, it means that GGMA is interested in providing
strategic interaction with other agents. GGMA records and
can analyze the behavior of the players. In special cases, one
can add a couple of constraints about the behavior, which is
required to be produced. Further, one can use GGMA for
agent and mechanism coevolution [Phelps, 2007]. GGMA
is the way for definition of mechanism design as task of
an agent. It is much easier to define mutation in game
2unequal to federal game management agent
description, which is written in logic as in C++. Otherwise,
GGMA can be used as an usual game server for conducting
experiments [Tagiew, 2009, e.g.].
Let us go back now to the question of the desired expres-
siveness of SIDL. It must represent at least finite games.
For instance, GALA can represent finite games of imperfect
information and GDL only of perfect information. Games
of incomplete3 information can be transformed to games
of imperfect information [Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994].
GAMBIT is able to solve games of imperfect information.
One another aspect in games, which is not considered in
classical game theory, is time. That is why the prefix of our
language is strategic interaction rather than game. Time in
games is very important in real-life domains. Delays and
timeouts can extend or reduce computation time for decision
making and hence change the resulting decision. It is also
interesting for the behavior analysis, at which time a decision
is made. In many cases, agents reason about the time of other
agents needed to make a decision. Timing is often of crucial
importance. SIDL is considered to represent finite games of
imperfect information with discrete time.
3 SIDL Definition
SIDL is strongly related to GDL. GDL provides as game
model, which is a game graph. This game graph has no
repeated states unlike the game trees for games in extensive
form. Every node of this graph is a game state described by
a couple of facts. A game state in GDL is not monolithic. It
can be manipulated by logic operations like a database. GDL
uses following key words:
role(R) : A participating agent R.
init(P) : A fact P, which is true at the initial state.
true(P) : A fact P, which is true at the current state.
next(P) : A fact P, which is true at the next state.
legal(R,M) : An action M, which is legal for a participant R.
does(R,M) : A player R, does an action M.
goal(R,V) : A player R gets an value V .
terminal : terminal holds, if the current state is terminal.
The rules for manipulation of the current state or also a pile
of facts are written in logic. For the initial state true(P)
holds, if init(P) holds. The difference between init and
true is that true appears only as precondition for a rule. In
contrast, init is a static statement. The postcondition of logic
rules are facts held by the predicates next, legal, goal and
terminal. The facts held by does are the commands sent from
the players to the game server. For every fact, which must
hold in the next state, one must define a rule headed by next.
Rules with the predicate legal prevent players from creating
facts held by predicate does, which are not in terms of the
game definition. GDL can represent only finite games of
3unequal to imperfect
perfect information, because there is no mechanism to hide
information from agents’s eyes or to enable simultaneous
moves. There are also no time dependent elements.
Regarding the deficiencies of GDL, we decided to develop
a particular philosophy for such a language. A strategic
interaction is a kind of a running engine. The engine runs
in discrete ’steps’. The time period between two ’steps’ is
always the same and called chronon. After a chronon is
expired, the engine makes some changes in its internal state.
This engine has a couple of switches. The set of switches is
constant. Every switch has a current state and an owner, who
can alter its state. Switching of the switches can impact the
running of the engine. A player acts by switching a switch.
Some player are able to see some of details of the internal
state of the engine.
Based on this philosophy, we constructed our language
SIDL:
chance(< BID >,< Distribution >) : A distribution for
random turns. < BID > is branching ID. <
Distribution > is an array of real numbers. Sum
of Distribution > is 1.0. Every member of <
Distribution > is higher than 0.0 and smaller than 1.0.
switch(< BID >,< Agent >,< Aliases >) : A switch
owned by a player < Agent > with an array of actions
< Aliases >. < BID > is unique. A < BID > identifies
either a chance or a switch.
f act(< P >,< Arity >) : Definition of a fact, which can be
stored in the database. < P > is a predicate name, which
is not in the set of key words for SIDL.
hidden(< F >,< HiddenFor >)⇐ (
nV
0
< F >) : A rule for
definition of imperfect information, where < F >::=<
P > (...). < HiddenFor > is an array of agents, for
which the fact is hidden. Using preconditions for this
rule, one can exactly define, what every agent can see
and what not.
init(< F >) : This has the same meaning as in GDL.
init(account(< Agent >,< Real >)) : account is a key word
in SIDL. It denotes an account balance of an agent.
init(does(< BID >,< Alias >)) : does is a also a key word
in SIDL. It denotes a state of a switch.
operation(<Operator >)⇐ ((
nV
0
< F >)∧ (
mV
0
< A >)∧
(
lV
0
<N >)∧(
kV
0
<G>)) : Definition of a state manipu-
lation operation. It can have four kinds of preconditions.
It is supposed to be lazy evaluated. < F > is for testing
the state. If < F >-statements hold, the rule manipulates
the state using the side effect predicates denoted below.
< A >::= ax(< F >) : Removes immediately a fact.
< N >::= next(< F >) : Creates a fact in the next state
< G >::= goal(< Agent >,< Payo f f >) : Adds
< Payo f f > to the account balance of < Agent >.
branching(<Operators >,< BID >) : < Operators > is
an array of operations, from which only one can be ex-
ecuted in a chronon. A branching is related to a switch
or a chance. The length of the aliases or the distribu-
tion in the related switch or chance must be exactly the
same as the length of operators in branching. Multiple
branchings can be related to the same switch or chance.
Branchings with only one operation have value nil as
BID.
command(< Agent >,< BID >,< Alias >) : This is per-
formed, if a player sends his action to the GGMA. The
side effect is that the related does-fact is reassigned.
terminal ⇐ (
nV
0
< F >) : This has the same meaning as in
GDL.
The facts are dynamic as in GDL. SIDL has no rules headed
by next. next is used for precondition statements and has
a side effect. The side effect is that the fact held by next
is holding in the next state. A fact is kept in the database
till it is not removed using predicate ax. We abandon the
predicate role. role(X) is replaced by init(account(X , )).
We do not need the predicate legal. That is because of our
philosophy. It is never illegal to switch own switches, but it
does not always cause any effect. The game terminates, if
the rule terminal holds. Multiple branchings can be related
to one switch. That is for modelling imperfect information.
In case of imperfect information, an action has different
consequences depending on current state which known to the
player.
4 Beyond Definition
The question, we handle in this chapter, is how to run a
GGMA on a game description in SIDL. GGMA promotes
his game management service for a game described in SIDL.
The other agents analyze the game definition and decide to
participate or not. After GGMA gathers enough players, he
starts to execute Alg. 1 which a combination of imperative
code and logic definitions. The names of the methods in
this algorithm are self-descriptive. The function ’lrun’ is a
connection between the imperative code of GGMA and a
logic interpreter for SIDL. It returns all possible assignments
of variables of a logic statement. The logic operation chronon
runs over all branchings, chooses an operation and executes
it if possible. A definition for chronon is below. The rule
tryoperation expresses the fact that in a game state only a
subset of operations can be executed. The logic operation
request deliveres all facts and for every fact names of agents
barred from viewing it:
tryoperation(O)⇐ operation(O)∨ true
handleBr(Operators,BID)⇐
(chance(BID,D)∧ random(Operators,D,O)∧
tryoperation(O))∨
(switch(BID, ,As)∧
does(BID,A)∧,map(As,A,Operators,O)∧
tryoperation(O))
chronon⇐
∀Operators(branching(Operators,BID)→
handleBr(Operators,BID))
request(X ,H)⇐ X ∧hidden(X ,H)
Algorithm 1: GGMA execution
Data: SIDL
while not lrun(terminal) do1
while not a chronon expired do2
command = receive command for altering3
lrun(command(command.agent,command.bid,4
command.alias))
record(command)5
end6
lrun(chronon)7
state = lrun((X ,H) : ∀Xrequest(X ,H))8
accounts = lrun((A,M) : ∀Xaccount(A,M))9
record(state, accounts)10
send2agents regarding hidden(state, accounts)11
end12
5 Case Study
To demonstrate SIDL in practice, we provide some examples.
As we claimed in contrast to GDL, SIDL has to be able to
represent two additional features - imperfect information and
time dependent elements. For the first feature, we considered
following situation. After a turn of the nature, Alice does not
know the current state, in which she has two actions ’A’, ’B’
and ’Wait’. There are only two states possible. This is a very
simple situation with imperfect information. We represent it
in following prolog style code:
fact(state, 1). // state(’current state ID’)
request(state(X), [alice]):-
state(X).
branching([nat(1), nat(2)], 0).
branching([a(1), b(1), wait], 1).
branching([a(2), b(2), wait], 1).
chance(0, [0.5, 0.5]).
switch(1, alice, [’A’, ’B’, ’Wait’]).
operation(nat(X)) :-
state(0),
ax(state(0)),
next(state(X)).
operation(a(X)) :-
state(X),
ax(state(X)),
next(state(10)),
goal(alice, 3-X). // payoff function
operation(b(X)) :-
state(X),
ax(state(X)),
next(state(10)),
goal(alice, X). // payoff function
operation(wait) :-
false.
terminal :-
state(10).
init(account(alice, 0.0)).
init(does(1, ’Wait’)). // waiting at start
init(state(0)).
As you see, Alice can not see the current state of the game.
The operations of only one of the branching with BID= 1 are
executable at same time. Alice can not change the executing
operation for every of her branchings separately. Operation
wait causes nothing.
A time period in a strategic interaction using SIDL is an
amount of chronons. If the chronon is defined to be 1 sec,
one can only act with time period of 1 sec, 2 sec, 3 sec and
so on. If we want to define a delay of 30 sec, we initialize
a fact like countdown(30). Then we define a branching with
only one rule. The rule in this branching decrements X in
countdown(X). In a same way, we can define a timeout. Sud-
den events can be modelled by a chance, which is related to a
branching with a wait and a suddenEvent operation.
The last example is a game with simultaneous turns. We
take for this example a single turn in the game ’Pico 2’
[Tagiew, 2008b]. There are 11 cards - 4 till 13 and 16. A
card beats another card, if it is higher and not higher than
two times the lower card. Following SIDL code is a reduced
representation of a single turn in this game.
fact(onhand, 2). // onhand(’Agent’,’a card of his’)
fact(thrown, 2). // thrown(’Agent’,’his thrown card’)
branching([a(4),a(5),a(6),a(7),a(8),a(9),
a(10),a(11),a(12),a(13),a(16)], 1).
branching([b(4),b(5),b(6),b(7),b(8),b(9),
b(10),b(11),b(12),b(13),b(16)], 2).
branching([payoff], nil). // BID is not required
switch(1, alice, [’4’,’5’,’6’,’7’,’8’,’9’,
’10’,’11’,’12’,’13’,’16’]).
switch(2, bob, [’4’,’5’,’6’,’7’,’8’,’9’,’10’,
’11’,’12’,’13’,’16’]).
operation(a(X)) :-
onhand(alice, X), // alice has a card X
not(thrown(alice, \_)), // alice did nothing yet
ax(onhand(alice, X)), // remove X from hand
next(thrown(alice, X)). // create thrown X
operation(b(X)) :-
onhand(bob, X),
not(thrown(bob, \_)),
ax(onhand(bob, X)),
next(thrown(bob, X)).
operation(payoff) :-
thrown(Agent1, C1), // thrown cards
thrown(Agent2, C2),
C1 > C2, // game rule definition
C1 <= C2*2,
goal(Agent1, 1). // Agent1 won
6 Conclusion
In this work, we discussed the advantages of using of a
description language for general strategic interactions. The
related work about this theme is summarized. A language
SIDL is presented. SIDL transcends in its expressiveness
all previous approaches. Examples for SIDL files are given.
Further, a design of GGMA is presented. GGMA is an
innovative approach in game computing. GGMA is an agent
based manifestation of mechanism design intent.
As future work we consider an automated method for
constructing GAMBIT acceptable game trees on the basis
of a SIDL file. This makes possible to solve analytically
game descriptions made in SIDL. The other direction is
visualization of a SIDL file and also visual editing.
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